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From the Co-Editors
Dear Hemisphere readers:
Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) and the University of
Miami’s Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) established the Miami Consortium for Latin American and
Caribbean Studies to join forces in promoting knowledge about Latin America and the Caribbean. This issue
of Hemisphere, co-edited by the centers’ directors, is an example of that partnership. What better theme for
this issue than the partnerships being established, negotiated and consolidated across the Pacific between Latin
America and Asia?
This issue also begins a broader debate on Asian-Latin American relations currently being undertaken by the
Miami Consortium. The Miami Consortium works hard to leverage its strategic position at the intersection
of North and South, and now it is positioning itself at the crossroads of the vast transformation happening
in the global South. For example, CLAS’s “Asia and Latin America in the 21st Century” series features highprofile events designed to examine and discuss the relationship between the two regions. Its “Miami’s Asia
Summit” brings together leaders to focus on the evolving ties between Asia and Latin America, and “Asia and
Latin America: Setting the Agenda” explores new dynamics of the relationship between the two regions, sets
a framework for studying their interaction in the coming decade and inaugurates CLAS’s Asia-Latin America
Working Group. Much work remains to be done to promote scholarship and deepen the understanding of these
two world regions today.
The relationship between Latin America and Asia is not new. The two regions have been linked since colonial
times. The Manila galleons known as naos de China sailed once or twice per year across the Pacific between
Spanish-controlled Manila and Acapulco, bringing riches from both continents. Soon after Latin American
independence, Chinese immigrants settled in countries throughout the region, lured by work on the railroads
and ports. Japanese immigrants who chose Brazil and Peru as their new homes soon followed and today, the
Japanese communities in Brazil and Peru are among the largest of the Japanese diaspora. More recently, Koreans
have set their sights on Latin American countries in search of investment opportunities. Industrious Korean
communities now flourish in several countries.
With prosperity after the Second World War came international projection. Japan and Taiwan became
visible presences in the region and provided important sources of economic aid and technical cooperation. The
transformation of the arid tropical savanna of the Brazilian Cerrado into the largest agricultural region in the
southern hemisphere owes a great deal to the Japan-Brazil Agricultural Development Cooperation Program. In
recognition, Brazilian researchers named the new tropical variety of soybean in the region “Doko,” after the late
Toshio Doko, President of Toshiba, Chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizations and a great friend
of Brazil. During the same period, Taiwan has emerged as one of the largest bilateral donors to Central America
at levels similar to the US and Spain.
In 2003, South Korea became the first Asian country to establish a free trade partnership with a Latin
American country, Chile. India’s interest and presence in the region is also steadily increasing. Over the course
of the past decade, the number of Latin American and Caribbean embassies based in New Delhi has increased by
a third and the number of Indian embassies in the LAC region has doubled.
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During the last decade, the big Asian actor in Latin America has been – and, some would argue, will
continue to be – the People’s Republic of China. The current Latin American economic miracle has been, to
a large extent, the result of the region’s growing ties to China. Latin American exports to China are booming
and Chinese investment in the region is as robust as can be. However, the complementary nature of their
economies is not enough to hide tensions generated by an unfavorable balance of trade and payments in China’s
favor. With few exceptions, Latin Americans are reacting with caution to Chinese interest in going beyond
trade and investment to build alliances with institutional players, including the military.
In the coming decades, Latin America’s international economic insertion will be determined by its
relationship with other emerging economies. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC), South-South trade is the leading engine of growth in global trade. In 1985, SouthSouth flows represented 6% of global trade; in 2010 they reached 25%, while North-North trade declined
from 63% to 38%. If these trends continue, South-South trade will surpass North-North trade by the year
2018. In addition to traditional migration patterns and the recent boom in investment and trade that continue
to dominate the relationship, the exchange of ideas and the establishment common positions on the world
stage are shaping the complex interaction between these regions. As this special issue attests, our Consortium is
paying close attention.
We would like to thank all who contributed to this issue. To the authors, our deepest gratitude for having
borne our impatience so graciously, and to our Consortium colleagues, Liesl Picard, Jordan Adams and Israel
Alonso, thank you for helping us in so many ways. Alisa Newman, Hemisphere’s longtime copy editor, has, as
usual, done a superb job. Thank you.

Cristina Eguizábal 				Ariel Armony
Director						Director
Latin American and Caribbean Center			
Center for Latin American Studies
Florida International University			University of Miami

4

Hemisphere Volume 21

Hemisphere Volume 21

5

I n t r o d u ci n g

t h e

I s s u e s

Latin America and Asia:
Globalization Trumps
Power Politics
By Julia C. Strauss

I

n the past decade, Asia
and Latin America have
embarked on an adventure
of discovery of the other,
encouraging a flurry of
interest in policymaking, business
and NGO circles. In the past 15

6
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years, China in particular has gone
from having no presence to speak
of in Latin America to being the
first or second leading trade partner
of such important economies as
Brazil, Peru and Chile. At present,
in the words of one Inter-American

Development Bank (IADB)
analyst, all eyes are on India as the
“next big thing” for Latin America.
The overwhelming dominance of
business and trade in the equation
raises the question, what is the
political nature of the relationship

Introducing the Issues

between Asia and Latin America?
In practice, the economic and
political spheres so inform each
other that it is difficult to conceive
of one without the other. In Asia
especially, politics and business
are intertwined, as revealed by the
strong links between government
and large businesses in China,
Japan, and Korea. In China
especially, it is difficult to ascertain
where the state ends and private
businesses begin. While the factors
behind the emergence of AsianLatin American connections at
this point in time may seem to be
predominantly economic, therefore,
political factors have also played
a role. The end of the Cold War
in the early 1990s and the sudden
dominance of neo-liberal norms of
globalization and trade interacted
with domestic developments in
Latin America (democratization)
and Asia (the global economic
rise of China and the emergence
of India and Brazil) to create
an economic and ideational
environment in which Asia and
Latin America complement and
“need” each other in a global
economic division of labor.
The economies of Asia and
Latin America are – with a few
important exceptions, such as
Mexico and, in part, Brazil – largely
complementary. The industrialized
economies of Asia, particularly those
of resource-poor countries such as
Japan and South Korea, require the
minerals, foodstuffs and oil that the
primary commodity exporters of
Latin America are able to supply. At
least until now, China’s oft-repeated

slogan of “win-win” in a globalized
world actually seems to hold
true under most conditions with
respect to Latin America, despite
legitimate concerns about who wins
(businesses and aggregate wealth vs.
organized labor, the environment
and local industries).
The global economic crisis of
the last four years has, if anything,
only intensified interest in AsianLatin American trade. In a world
in which US and European political
institutions have been revealed as
profoundly ill-equipped to deal
with current economic challenges,
it is entirely understandable that
states and societies in both Asia and
Latin America would find much of
value in the other in political, social
and economic terms, and much
of common interest. For all their
differences, most of the states in
Asia and Latin America, with the
exception of Japan, have directly
experienced the humiliations
of colonialism and protracted
economic underdevelopment. Most
identify with the developing world
and have reasons to be skeptical of
US hegemony.
Politics, particularly international
politics, has long been conceptualized
in terms of the direct pursuit of
strategic interests. For a long time
this kind of thinking accounted
for the shallowness of political
relations between most of Asia and
Latin America. Separated by a vast
ocean and with economies largely
oriented toward the United States,
Asia had little incentive to involve
itself in Latin America, other than
China’s pursuit of formal diplomatic

recognition and its attempts to
isolate Taiwan. Traces of these
concerns remain, particularly for
China, as most of the small states
that still recognize Taiwan are in
Central America and the Caribbean.
A political view of Asia and
Latin America in the twenty-first
century must incorporate the
crosscutting currents of accelerating
post-Cold War globalization. The
two regions are experiencing a
rapid proliferation of ties of all
sorts: economic ties through
trade and investment, personal
ties through the soft power
instruments of educational and
cultural exchange, and individual
and family ties through sojourning
and migration. In this rapidly
expanding complex, politics are
never far from the surface, whether
the formal world of high politics;
less easily discerned but perhaps
more important informal, local and
personal politics; and issues that
link the two, such as the Chinese
government’s displeasure over the
Dalai Lama’s recent visit to Mexico.
Asia and Latin America are active
participants in the extraordinary
global movement toward multilateral
forums and international
organizations since the early 1990s.
These include organizations to
promote or implement free trade
agreements, such as Mercosur, the
Andean Community and Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and
others intended to ensure regional
security and stability, including the
Organization of American States,
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai
Hemisphere Volume 21
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Security Organization. A great deal
of slippage has occurred between the
economic and the political, however,
and many multilateral organizations
founded for one purpose have
expanded beyond their original
writ and clientele. Mercosur, for
example, began to assume political
functions by the mid 1990s and is
now deeply committed to promoting
political as well as economic
integration for all of South America.
ASEAN was originally founded as a
security organization to contain the
spread of communism from Vietnam
and China, but it now includes
Cambodia and (communist)
Vietnam as members and frequently
engages in dialogue with China and
Japan. Political interest has also
grown in extra-regional multilateral
forums and organizations, as in
the case of South Korea’s (2005)
and China’s (2009) decisions to
join Japan’s long-standing presence
(1976) in the IADB.
In considering the proliferation
of formal and informal contacts
between Asia and Latin America,
two broad analytical points can aid
in sorting out confusion. First,
Japan’s early experiences have
provided a template for other Asian
countries in establishing their own
versions of the developmental state
at home and in their pursuit of
foreign influence abroad. Second,
a range of soft power tools and
informal relations, especially
through migration and diaspora
communities, play an important
role and converge with formal
bilateral relations and multilateral
institutions in interesting ways.
8
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Brazil, for example, now hosts the
largest community of citizens of
Japanese descent anywhere outside
of their homeland. Japan was also
well positioned to capitalize on its
pre-World War II ties with Latin
America and develop the type of aid
and investment policies that are now
thought of as particularly Chinese
(investment in big infrastructure
projects; little attention to
environmental or governance
concerns). Korean businesses and
migration began to flow toward
Latin America in the 1990s, and the
South Korean government is deeply
involved in establishing academic
and public policy programs
in Argentina and other Latin
American countries. China is not
far behind, coordinating frequent
bilateral visits, the establishment
of soft power institutions such as
Confucius Institutes, and a recently
released policy paper outlining
China’s efforts to accelerate mutual
knowledge and cooperation in Latin
America in every imaginable sphere.
China’s profile, important as it
is, should not be viewed outside
a wider Asian context. The
importance of East Asia for Latin
America was formally recognized in
1995 with the IADB’s establishment
of an Asia office in Tokyo to facilitate
linkages between governments and
business communities in Japan,
Korea and China. The office
also organizes informational
and academic seminars on Latin
America for the benefit of those
constituencies. One can only
imagine what kind of concerted
effort the Indian government will

make to formalize and accelerate
its formal relations with Latin
America to complement its
increasing private investment, and
how a potential Indian approach
might differ from the more statist
Northeast Asian response.
Asia and Latin America are
pursuing political and economic
linkages with the aim of, at least
partially, offsetting the historic
economic and political dominance
of the United States and Western
Europe. Yet even as they strive
to deepen formal and informal,
bilateral and multilateral relations,
US influence provides both
opportunities and constraints.
Chinese political and policy
journals frequently refer to Latin
America as being in the United
States’ “backyard,” despite the
problematic connotations of the
term for Latin Americans. In these
and other ways, early twenty-first
century patterns of globalization
provide the currents of economic,
social and political interaction
between Asia and Latin America.
Trade is a big part of this complex
of relationships, but so too are the
multitude of ways in which people,
networks and concepts travel,
become indigenized, and provide
the raw materials for mutual
understanding and cooperation. ■
Julia C. Strauss is Senior Lecturer in
Chinese Politics in the Department of
Politics and International Studies and
a member of the Centre of Chinese
Studies at the University of London.
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What Is China to Latin America?
By Ariel Armony

A

ny discussion about
Latin America’s
economic situation
today inevitably
involves the topic
of China. Trade between China
and Latin America has grown
exponentially in recent years,
skyrocketing from $10 billion in
2000 to $179 billion in 2010.
China’s sizzling economic growth
and its emergence as a global
economic power have come with a
rising diplomatic, cultural and even
military presence in the Americas.
In spite of the impressive figures,
there is considerable debate
about the impact of China’s
economic rise on Latin American
development. As Kevin Gallagher
and Roberto Porzecanski put it,
the “dragon in the room” is the
challenge China poses to Latin
America’s competitiveness in world
and regional markets. Trade with
China is also charming some
countries in the region toward a
path of specialization that may
hurt their long-term prospects for
economic development.
China had virtually no presence
in Latin America only two decades
ago, and its expansion has been
felt as a sudden “desembarco”
(landing). Latin Americans are
still trying to make sense of this
landing. Public perception of
China is not as positive in the
region as it is in Africa, but in
recent polls a higher percentage of
Latin American respondents rated

China’s influence on their countries
as a good thing than those who
could say the same about the US.
These figures suggest a willingness
to accept China as a newcomer in

different challenges across the
region.
For the most part, Latin American
visions of China are based on an
“imported Orientalism” dominated

Brazilians rehearse the Dragon dance for the upcoming Chinese New Year celebration at Liberdade
Square in São Paulo, Brazil on January 19, 2010. Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP/Getty Images.

the hemisphere and to welcome
deeper relations with the East
Asian country.
Upon closer inspection, of
course, significant variation can
be found across countries and
sectors within each country. The
very concept of Latin America has
become gradually more diluted
as countries in the region pursue
different strategies of regional
integration. More important, as
Gallagher and Porzecanski explain,
Latin America’s trade with China is
concentrated in only six countries
and ten commodities. China’s
impact is uneven and poses very

by misrepresentations of Chinese
society and culture. A combination
of timeworn images of China as
“mysterious” and the projection of
Western beliefs and interests onto
China have colored Latin American
conceptions of the East Asian
country. The lacunae of knowledge
about China in Latin America and
the largely blank slate upon which
the relationship is being built offer
an opportunity to create a new
vision to correct imported views and
existing biases.
Throughout Latin America,
rather than being considered a
distant actor, China is increasingly
Hemisphere Volume 21
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viewed as a tangible, concrete,
albeit looming and problematic,
presence. Although political
preferences and ideology may
influence media coverage in
any given area, some common
concerns have emerged about
China’s expansionism; namely,
skepticism regarding the actual
benefits that China brings to the
region, and the long-term effects
of this engagement. As expected,
coverage of China emphasizes
the East Asian nation’s economic
power, but questions have also
arisen about China’s commitment
to fulfill its responsibilities as a
rising global power. Many Latin
Americans wonder about the
sustainability and global impact
of Chinese involvement. China’s
landing in Latin America has
triggered new debates focused
on strategic options, damage
control and development models,
among other issues. Most of the
discussions occur in the realm of
economics and politics, yet the
debate over ideas, identity, rhetoric
and worldviews is probably the one
with the most serious implications
for the future of the interaction
between the two regions.
What is China to Latin America?
Among other things, China
represents a market, a partner
and a competitor. China’s need
for primary commodities to feed
its manufacturing growth and
unprecedented urbanization entails
a vast demand for everything
from soybeans to copper as well as
higher prices for such commodities
in the international market. Latin
10

Hemisphere Volume 21

American exports to China have
skyrocketed in response to this
demand in the last decade. High
commodity prices and ample
revenues are helping to sustain
economic growth and strengthen
fiscal accounts in several countries.
As mentioned above, however,
Chinese demand mainly benefits
commodity producers in South
American countries such as Brazil,
Chile, Argentina and Peru. The
smaller countries of Central
America and the Caribbean cannot
benefit from trade with China
unless they find a niche market
(such as Costa Rican coffee). The
reliance on primary commodities
also entails the risk of resource
dependency for exporting
nations. This pattern of trade has
clear limitations for long-term
development. Among other
limitations, it is not a big job
creator and it does not contribute
by itself (that is, without state
intervention) to alleviate poverty
and inequality. In brief, China is a
market for Latin America, and one
with great potential, but a shift
from “fairy tale” to realism will
have to occur if the region wants
sustained benefits in the long run.
Is China a partner for Latin
America? China has the potential
to collaborate with Latin American
countries in a number of ways:
in the realms of technology,
infrastructure, poverty reduction
and educational programs; as
a source of foreign investment
and aid; and as an ally on the
diplomatic front. As Juan
Gabriel Tokatlian has argued,

for example, China’s model of
international diplomacy entails
some attractive notions for Latin
America: multilateral politics,
noninterference in domestic
affairs, sovereign integrity,
horizontal collaboration between
“equals” and pragmatism. A
concrete potential for partnership
exists in this realm.
China conceives of its national
security as a three-pronged
approach: “National Sovereignty”
(territorial integrity and national
reunification), “Comprehensive
Security” (preservation of its
political and economic system and
cultural heritage), and “Security
in the Global System” (terms of
insertion in the international
system). To guarantee terms of
insertion that could satisfy the
Chinese leadership’s demand for
“equality, fairness, and justice,”
Beijing needs partners. Latin
American countries can play a
role in the pursuit of a common
agenda oriented to counter US
hegemony; just as China often
perceives that the US strategy of
“engagement” is actually intended
to contain its rising power, Latin
America has a strong preference
for multipolarity.
As a major player in multilateral
organizations, China understands
the necessity of courting votes.
Beijing pays significant attention
to promoting partnerships with
a wide variety of countries,
regardless of their size or economic
power. Confucius’s phrase
“One more friend, one more
way” captures well this strategic

Special Focus

approach. Still, it is important to
note that Beijing conceives of its
relationship with Latin America as
under the lens of US hegemonic
power in the hemisphere.
Accordingly, any convergence with
Latin America in international
politics, and particularly in
hemispheric politics, is subordinate
to its implications for Sino-US
relations. In addition, China’s
external model of diplomacy may
be seductive to Latin American
countries, but the region’s
commitment to democracy – even
with serious deficiencies – has
defined a path that diverges from
China’s domestic political model.
Brazil in particular will most
likely have to face this divergence
in the near future as it adopts a
leadership role in the global South.
There is a dark side to SinoLatin American partnership. It
involves the risk that China’s zou
chuqu or “going out” strategy
(official encouragement of Chinese
enterprises searching for greater
investment opportunities around
the world, whether large, stateowned enterprises or individual
and family entrepreneurs seeking
business deals overseas) may
bring with it traditional informal
business practices and closeddoor deal making. Chinese
corruption is likely to find a
welcoming environment in Latin
America and could contribute to
undermine the rule of law in the
region. Similarly, China’s foreign
aid programs – which are touted as
different from Western assistance
because they have no strings

attached – lack transparency
and accountability. Criticism of
China’s foreign aid has been so
extensive that in early 2011 Beijing
released an official report intended
to explain its foreign assistance
practices, but which in fact
provided only limited information
on the specifics of Chinese aid
programs and distribution of funds
around the world.
There can be no doubt that
China is a competitor for Latin
America. The expansion of
China’s manufacturing capabilities
is damaging Latin American
exports in global, regional and
domestic markets. Chinese
exports are not only competing
with domestic production in Latin
American countries, they are also
undermining the competitiveness
of Latin American exports in
third markets, namely, the United
States, the European Union and
the markets of trading partners
in Latin America. Gallagher
and Porzecanski calculate that,
as of 2006, “94 percent of all
Latin American and Caribbean
manufacturing exports were
‘under threat’ from their Chinese
counterparts, representing 40
percent of all [the region’s]
exports.” Sectors such as electrical
equipment, metal products and
industrial machinery are facing the
greatest impact.
China’s emergence as a
competitor is a wake-up call
for Latin America. Blaming
China for not playing by the
rules is not enough. Chinese
competition stresses the need

for Latin American countries to
increase spending on research
and marketing, improve product
quality, invest in infrastructure
and reduce logistical costs. Sound
policies that seek diversification
and upgrade the quality of the
domestic labor force are urgently
needed.
Even as observers attempt to
make sense of China’s landing in
Latin America, India is attempting
to follow its model. As Jorge
Heine explains in this issue, India’s
trade with Latin America is still
modest compared to China’s, but
it has had a growing economic
presence since 2000. Analysts
expect that, as India catches up
with China in terms of exports
and foreign direct investment,
its trade with Latin America will
expand dramatically within the
next decade.
We are witnessing times of
extraordinary transformation.
These changes pose unprecedented
challenges and unique
opportunities for Latin America.
Deeper integration between
Latin America and China (and,
eventually, India) will require a
combination of coherent policies,
realism and innovation if these
new relationships can be expected
to yield positive outcomes and
synergies for Latin America in the
long run. ■
Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in
Latin American Studies, Professor of
International Studies and Director of
the Center for Latin American Studies
(CLAS) at the University of Miami.
Hemisphere Volume 21
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Chinese Investment in Latin
America: A Win-Win Situation
By Jiang Shixue

C

hina publicly
acknowledged the
strategic importance
of Latin America for
its economic policy
for the first time in a policy paper
published in November 2008, but
for the last decade or so, it has been
developing much closer relations
with the region. According to
Chinese statistics, bilateral trade
increased from $15 billion in 2001
to more than $200 billion in 2011.
Total Chinese investment in the
region grew from $4.6 billion in
2003 to $43.9 billion in 2010 –
although 92%, or $40.5 billion, was
concentrated in the British Virgin
Islands and the Cayman Islands.
Political, non-governmental, cultural
and even military cooperation and
exchange have also moved forward
steadily. The current relationship
between China and Latin America
is most likely the best it has ever
been since Columbus “discovered”
the New World in 1492 – even if,
as some scholars argue, the Chinese
navigator Zheng He beat him to it
in 1421.
Both China and Latin America
have expressed their interest and
determination to promote bilateral
relations. To achieve this objective,
however, both sides will need to
address a number of issues. The
first and most important priority
is to reduce trade frictions.
Cheaply priced Chinese products
have posed great challenges to
uncompetitive enterprises in Latin
America, resulting in efforts to
restrict Chinese exports, mainly
through anti-dumping. Since
1989, when Brazil became the first

12
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Latin American country to levy
anti-dumping tariffs against China
to protect its domestic market,
many of the major trade partners
in Latin America have resorted to
this practice. Anti-dumping tariffs
can be extremely high. In the early
1990s, for instance, Mexico charged
a tariff of 1105% for Chinese shoes,
a rate tantamount to a total ban on
imports. Most of Latin America’s
anti-dumping cases against China,
in fact, are incompatible with World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
According to the terms of China’s
admission into the WTO in 2001,
the country will automatically be
granted so-called market economy
status (MES) in 2016. By then,
many Chinese officials believe,
Chinese exports might face less
anti-dumping from trade partners,
including those in Latin America.
At the very least, China’s trade
partners will not be permitted
to choose a third country at will
for price comparison in judging
whether China dumps or not.
Without MES, China does not
stand up well to comparison given
its low labor costs.
At the same time that Latin
America has courted greater Chinese
investment in the region, China has
been implementing a “going global”
strategy, encouraging Chinese
enterprises to invest abroad. To take
advantage of this win-win scenario,
Latin America needs to improve
its investment climate. Chinese
investors, in turn, must familiarize
themselves with the laws of the host
countries, prepare for labor strikes
and adapt to local business practices.
Undoubtedly, they should also

assume more social responsibility.
The second issue in improving the
bilateral relationship is to overcome
fear of China on the Latin American
side. Public opinion in Latin
America often fails to recognize that,
on the whole, China contributes
positively to development in the
region. For instance, China’s
demand for Latin American raw
materials has pushed up the prices
of these resources on the world
market. No less important, cheap
Chinese exports have helped
curtail inflation. In April 2011,
a Financial Times reporter found
that almost every Chinese product
sold at a small shop in a São Paulo
favela, from lipstick and handbags
to plastic figures of Buzz Lightyear,
was five times cheaper than the
same item made in Brazil. “It has
to be,” the shop owner said of the
ubiquity of Chinese merchandise,
“otherwise lots of people here
couldn’t afford it.”
The third issue concerns the
matter of mutual understanding
to consolidate trust and defuse
misconceptions. Official visits help;
China’s president and vice president
traveled to Latin America within
two months of each other in late
2004 and early 2005, and again in
late 2008 and early 2009. Generally
speaking, however, geographical
distance and differences in language,
cultural traditions, political systems,
etc., have resulted in a lack of
mutual understanding between the
two sides.
Finally, the “US factor” is an
obstacle in China’s relations with
Latin America. Members of the US
Congress, the media and even some
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academics have expressed concern
at the growing Chinese presence
in Latin America. In April 2006,
Thomas Shannon, then the
United States Assistant Secretary
of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, traveled to Beijing and
discussed China’s policy towards
Latin America with the Chinese
Foreign Ministry.
The US has no cause for concern.
China understands that Latin
America is in the United States’
“backyard” and has neither the
interest nor ability to challenge its

traditional sphere of influence there.
Moreover, China’s relations with
Latin America are part of a broader
trend of South-South economic
cooperation that benefits the United
States as well.
Spain has offered to help China
develop its bilateral relations with
Latin America, taking advantage of
its linguistic and cultural ties and
well-established market networks in
the region, and so far, the results of
this triangulation are encouraging.
On October 1, 2010, for instance,
Sinopec, one of China’s largest

energy companies, announced
that it would invest $7.1 billion in
Repsol YPF Brasil, giving it a 40%
stake in the Brazilian enterprise.
If similar triangulation could be
established between China, the
United States and Latin America,
wouldn’t the result be a triple win
for all three parties? ■
Jiang Shixue is a professor at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
and vice president of the Chinese
Association of Latin American Studies.
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The New Banks in Town:
Chinese Finance in Latin America
By Amos Irwin, Kevin Gallagher and
Katherine Koleski

I

n the last few years, China
has gone from being a nonplayer in Latin American
finance to ranking as one of
the region’s leading creditors.
Although individual loans have
been reported in the press, no
systematic studies have documented
the rise of Chinese lending in Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC).
The lack of public information
about these loans has caused their
terms and conditions to become a
source of speculation and concern.
The flood of China-LAC loans
has been criticized by Western
observers. The Financial Times,
for example, warns of “escalating
competition over loan deals” in
Latin America between Chinese
banks and the World Bank. These
sources argue that Chinese banks
offer ultra-low interest rates to
outcompete Western banks.
Chinese banks, they warn, are
replacing Western banks that attach
policy conditions to protect social
and environmental welfare. They
suggest that China is exploiting
LAC oil exporters with oil-backed
loans, or “loans-for-oil.”
Most of these claims are either
unfounded or come with many
caveats. Since none of these sources
have access to hard data on Chinese
lending to LAC, their claims are
largely based on speculation. To
attempt a more empirically-based
understanding of these issues, we
built a comprehensive database
of Chinese lending in LAC and
compared it to lending by other
major players.

14
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We confirm that Chinese lending
to the region is large and growing
at an impressive rate. Our work
attempts to offer a balanced view
of the implications of such lending.
While others have thrown their
hands in the air in praise or in
fear, we see the potential for both
positive and negative consequences.
China’s lending to LAC brings new
benefits to the region, but it also
brings new risks.
Most of China’s international
lending comes from the China
Development Bank (CDB) and

China Export-Import (Ex-Im)
Bank. During its 1994 reforms of
the financial sector, the Chinese
government created CDB and
China Ex-Im as “policy banks.”
Their loans serve the government’s
policy objectives of supporting
infrastructure, industry and
exports. Both banks have backed
Jiang Zemin’s “going global”
policy, which encourages the
internationalization of Chinese
investment and trade by lending
to overseas Chinese companies
and business partners. In the
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Figure 1: Comparison of Chinese, World Bank, IADB, and US Ex-Im Lending to LAC.

last few years, these banks have
become leading creditors for Latin
American governments.
Since Chinese banks do not
issue transparent annual reports or
statistics, there is no easy way to
measure their loans abroad. Given
the lack of data, we examined
government, bank and press reports
in both China and borrowing
countries to compile a list of loans
and their characteristics. We
estimate that since 2005, Chinese
“policy banks” have committed
approximately $75 billion in
loans to LAC. In 2010, Chinese
banks committed more than the
World Bank, Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) and US
Ex-Im Bank combined (see Figure
1). Our estimate should not be
taken as a precise sum but rather a
well-documented ballpark estimate.
On the one hand, we may have
underestimated Chinese finance in
Latin America because we do not
include loans under $50 million.
On the other hand, we may have
overestimated the total because the
parties involved could partially or
entirely cancel some loans. Loan
agreements, such as Argentina’s $10

billion agreement in 2010, simply
set an amount to be carved up
into projects later and may be only
partially fulfilled.
No Cutthroat Interest Rate
Competition
Many Western observers have
worried that Chinese banks are
“competing” against Western
banks with low interest rates.
The Washington Post argues
that China is using “low-ball
financing” to make its export
credits more attractive. “China
has handed out billions of dollars
at less than 1 percent interest,”
the editors note. “This has
become a headache for Western
competitors, especially members
of the 32-nation Organization
for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which long
ago agreed not to use financing as a
competitive tool.”
In fact, our study shows that
both CDB and China Ex-Im
charge higher rates on most of their
loans to LAC than their Western
counterparts require. China Ex-Im
offers some smaller loans at lower
rates but, like the World Bank, it

does so to provide development
aid rather than to undercut its
competitors. The majority of
China Ex-Im’s LAC funding carries
market rates.
When we compare development
banks, CDB’s interest rates actually
exceed World Bank (IBRD) rates.
For example, in 2010, CDB offered
Argentina a $10 billion loan at 600
basis points above LIBOR (interest
rate for loans between banks).
The same year, the IBRD granted
Argentina a $30 million loan at 85
basis points above LIBOR. In all
the cases we found, CDB interest
rates exceeded IBRD rates on
similar loans.
When we compare the Chinese
and American export credit
agencies, China Ex-Im offers
slightly lower rates than US Ex-Im
on small projects and higher rates
on larger projects. To compare
China and US Ex-Im interest rates,
we subtract the OECD’s “country
risk” premiums to compensate
for the fact that some countries
are riskier than others. While the
US bank charges 1.5-2.5% above
the OECD risk premium, China
Ex-Im’s low rates fall only slightly
above the premium itself. Other
than the high rate for Ecuador’s
Coca-Codo-Sinclair Dam, China’s
rates fall 1-2% below US rates.
Rather than as cutthroat
competition, the low China ExIm rates should be viewed as
development aid. Instead of offering
below-market credit through its
development bank, China channels
it through its Ex-Im Bank. This
explains both the higher CDB and
lower Ex-Im rates. Since the IBRD
is offering below-market interest
rates, it is no surprise that CDB’s
interest rates are higher. It is also
unsurprising that China Ex-Im
Bank’s concessional interest rates
fall 1-2% below US Ex-Im’s
commercial rates.
Hemisphere Volume 21
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The majority of China Ex-Im’s
lending, however, is unsubsidized
commercial lending at much higher
interest rates. Commercial loans
constitute more than 80% of China
Ex-Im’s lending to LAC, including
a $2.4 billion loan for the Baha
Mar resort in the Bahamas and
a $1.7 billion loan for Ecuador’s
Coca-Codo-Sinclair dam. China
Ex-Im Bank charged 6.9% interest
on the latter, about 2% higher than
US Ex-Im rates even adjusting for
Ecuador’s high-risk premium. The
evidence therefore suggests that
neither CDB nor China Ex-Im
subsidizes interest rates to undercut
Western lenders.
Chinese Banks Give Large Loans
to High-Risk Countries
One would expect Chinese
banks to loan to creditworthy
countries that can afford their
commercial interest rates. Instead,
Chinese banks dedicated 61%
of their lending to the lowestrated borrowers in Latin America,
Venezuela and Ecuador. This is an
enormous share considering that
these countries make up only 8%
of the LAC region’s population and
7% of its GDP. Over the same
period (since 2005), these two
nations received 13% of IADB
loans and virtually nothing from
the World Bank or US Ex-Im Bank.
Meanwhile, Chinese banks gave
almost nothing to West-friendly
Mexico, Colombia and Peru despite
their sizeable economies and
resource endowments. Only Brazil
and Argentina received significant
loans from both Western and
Chinese banks.
Chinese loans to high-risk
countries are helping compensate
for the absence of sovereign debt
markets. Ecuador essentially cut
itself off from mainstream lending
16
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by defaulting on its sovereign
debt in 2008-09. The Venezuelan
government has scared off investors
by violating private property
rights. As a result, the sovereign
debt markets charge Ecuador and
Venezuela unaffordable spreads
of 935 and 1220 basis points,
respectively, four to six times higher
than Colombian and Peruvian
spreads. Chinese lending is
substituting for private capital that
these high-risk countries cannot
afford. In Ecuador’s case, Chinese
lending has given the government a
second chance to rebuild both the
economy and investor confidence.
Chinese Banks Lower Costs by
Attaching Strings: Loans-for-Oil
and Purchase Requirements
How can Chinese banks offer
such high-risk loans at affordable
interest rates? We have seen that for
the most part they do not use state
subsidies to lower interest rates.
The question then becomes why
the cost of their loans is so low. For
example, CDB offered Venezuela
$20 billion at a floating rate of
50-285 basis points over LIBOR.
In private sovereign debt markets,
Venezuela would have to pay a
spread of 935 basis points. China
Ex-Im’s commercial loans are also
low-cost; it charged Ecuador 6.9%
on its $1.7 billion export credit,
well below that country’s 838 basis
point spread on sovereign debt.
Chinese banks lower the cost
of loans to high-risk countries by
attaching strings such as purchase
requirements. CDB’s $1.7 billion
export credit to Ecuador is not
actually a loan; it is a line of credit
for the Ecuadorian government
with Chinese state-run SinoHydro
Corporation. Since the money goes
straight to supporting Chinese stateowned companies, an Ecuadorian

default would be far less costly to
the Chinese government. We found
conditions in almost every Chinese
loan requiring the borrowers to use
the funds for Chinese construction,
oil, telecommunications, satellite or
train equipment.
In addition to purchase
requirements, CDB has recently
begun lowering financing costs
with “loans-for-oil.” Such loans
usually work as follows: CDB
grants a billion-dollar loan to an
oil-exporting country like Ecuador.
Petroecuador pledges to ship
hundreds of thousands of barrels of
oil to China every day for the life
of the loan. Chinese oil companies
deposit their oil payments into
Petroecuador’s CDB account. CDB
withdraws the interest due on the
loan directly from this account. As
long as the country keeps exporting
oil to China, CDB will siphon
out a portion of the revenues to
collect interest on the loan. As
CDB founder Chen Yuan notes,
“backing loans with oil shipments
effectively keeps risks to a minimum
level.” The oil-backed arrangement
helps explain the low interest rate
on the $20 billion loan-for-oil to
Venezuela.
Many Latin American and US
observers argue that the loans
exploit borrowers, largely because
they misunderstand the deals.
Many assume that the borrowers
are simply giving a set amount of
oil to China to pay back the loan;
however, China’s loans-for-oil
with Latin America use market
prices. China cannot “lock in”
low prices or “hedge” against
world oil price fluctuations
because the contracts require it to
pay the daily market price.
The financing terms seem to be
better for the South Americans than
most people believe. Although
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Ecuador’s prices are based on
US market prices, Petroecuador
subtracts a per-barrel “differential”
because its oil is of lower quality
than US oil. At the same time,
it charges a small per-barrel
“premium” for committing to
sell so much oil in advance. Far
from being unfair to Ecuador, the
differentials and premiums are
consistent with Ecuador’s other
recent oil deals.
Chinese Loans:
A Different
Development Model
Chinese banks
tend to loan
money to LAC for
infrastructure and
heavy industry,
while World Bank
and IADB loans
span a wider range
of governmental,
social and
environmental
purposes. The
Chinese banks
channel 87% of
their loans into the
energy, mining, infrastructure,
transportation and housing
(EMITH) sectors. Only 29% of
IADB loans and 34% of World
Bank loans go to those sectors;
instead, these institutions direct
more than a third of their loans
toward the health, social and
environment sectors in LAC,
which are essentially devoid of
Chinese investment.
China’s lending policy obeys a
different development philosophy.
In contrast to the Millennium
Development Goals’ focus on
social welfare, Chinese banks focus
on economic growth. They fund
projects that will create jobs and
open up new economies for Chinese

trade and investment. The Chinese
government models its EMITH
development aid on the World Bank
loans of the 1950s and 1960s and
Japan’s loans to China in the 1970s.
Chinese Banks Roll Out New
Environmental Guidelines
Critics have charged that
China turns a blind eye to the
environmental impact of the projects
it funds. In fact, Chinese banks

have adopted new environmental
guidelines containing substantive
requirements and standards, even if
they are not as demanding as those
followed by Western banks. The
Chinese guidelines require projects
to pass an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) prior to funding.
Unlike their Western counterparts,
however, Chinese EIAs require the
project to comply with current
environmental standards in the host
country rather than international
industry standards. Chinese
banks require public consultations
with communities affected by
the projects but they do not
include a grievance mechanism or
independent monitoring and review,

which are key requirements of
Western banks. Like their Western
counterparts, Chinese banks
require an ex-post EIA. The main
difference, therefore, is the emphasis
on compliance with domestic as
opposed to international standards
and the absence of a forum to
redress grievances or obtain thirdparty approval.
It is unclear to what extent
Chinese banks will actually
follow these new
guidelines in LAC.
China only recently
began lending to the
region, so we cannot
measure their track
record. Compliance
with environmental
guidelines, however, has
remained a stumbling
block within China, and
theoretical guidelines
will only translate into
real reforms with the
active support of the
banks themselves.
It is our hope that our
study and other similar
research can help spark
a more empirically based discussion
among policymakers and scholars
about China’s role in Latin America.
After more than a decade of
significant Chinese engagement with
the region, it is far too simplistic to
think of China as “good” or “bad”
for LAC development. China offers
new benefits even as it presents
new risks. ■
Kevin Gallagher is an associate
professor of international relations
at Boston University and a senior
researcher at the Global Development
and Environment Institute (GDAE)
at Tufts University. Amos Irwin and
Katherine Koleski are researchers
at GDAE.
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Mexico and China: Competition
vs. Complementarity
By Enrique Dussel Peters

I

n the last decade, China
and Latin America have
increased trade dramatically,
and Chinese foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the
region has experienced significant
growth in parallel. Research into
these trends has been insufficient,
especially considering that China
is now the region’s second leading
trading partner. Adding to the
confusion, Chinese and Latin
American sources often report
different statistics. According to
recent estimates, however, Chinese
FDI in the region accounted for
more than $30 billion in 20102011.
Several negative trends are
associated with this increase.
Regional trade specialization with
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China, in the form of low valueadded raw material exports and
imports of higher value-added
manufacturing, has resulted in
technological and balance of
trade limitations, as well as new
development challenges. Studies
of value-added chains in raw
materials also show an effective
process of downgrading in some
cases. As a result of new Chinese
regulations and pressures, Latin
American exports have declined
in technology, value-added and
sophistication.
China’s economic development
has called into question the
export-oriented strategy Mexico
has followed since the late
1980s. China, in contrast, has
pursued a long-term strategy

with active public policies since
the early 1980s, with special
emphasis on industry, trade,
regional development, education,
innovation, urbanization,
exchange rate and fiscal
policy. Comparatively, China’s
socioeconomic performance has
been outstanding. In 1980-2010,
China’s GDP increased 14 times
more than Mexico’s. China was
able to lift more than 400 million
inhabitants out of poverty, while
Mexico’s poverty rate increased
during the same period. In 2010,
China exported $45.6 billion worth
of goods to Mexico, while Mexican
exports to China totaled $17.9
billion, a difference of 155%.
China has become Mexico’s
second largest trading partner.
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The average annual growth rate
(AAGR) of Mexico’s total exports
during 1995-2010 was 9.2%, and
10% for total imports. The AAGR
of its trade with China, however,
was 37.1% (exports) and 34.7%
(imports). As a result, the United
States’ share of Mexico’s trade is the
lowest it has ever been.
Another relevant feature of
Mexico’s trade with China is its
11:1 import/export ratio. In
other words, Mexico has a massive
trade deficit with China. The
composition of Mexico’s trade with
China is also significant. Until
2006-2007, electronics, auto parts
and automobiles accounted for
more than two-thirds of Mexican
exports to China. This proportion
has changed drastically, and by
2010 copper, oil and other raw
materials had displaced these
products. In turn, Mexico imports
almost exclusively manufactured
goods from China, particularly
electronics, auto parts and
other increasingly sophisticated
technological goods.
Recent research has also found
that only 9% of Mexican imports
from China in 2010 were in
the form of consumer goods.

The overwhelming bulk was
intermediate and capital goods.
The figures require more analysis,
but they appear to contradict the
perception that Chinese imports
compete massively with domestic
production and suggest that they
could, on the contrary, improve
the competitiveness of the Mexican
production sector.
Trade issues, including the
trade deficit, trade and non-trade
barriers, tariffs and similar issues,
increasingly define Mexico’s overall
bilateral relationship with China.
Total Chinese imports, for example,
pay effective tariffs of 1.89% –
more than total Mexican imports,
which pay 0.80% – while a small
group of 204 items paid a tariff of
106% in 2008 and a maximum of
35% in 2012.
Tensions between the two
countries, escalating with the
AH1N1 virus in 2009, the visit
of the Dalai Lama in 2011, and
declarations by Mexican and
Chinese officials since then,
have limited new Chinese FDI
in Mexico. The Economic
Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimated
total Chinese FDI in Latin America

Asian Globalization and Latin America
Project at FIU

The Asian Globalization and Latin America Project (AGLA) at
FIU is an innovative trans-regional program that combines an
academic certificate program, faculty development, Chinese and
Japanese language programs and study abroad opportunities.
AGLA, originally funded by a grant from Department of
Education, links two major regional programs at FIU: the

at around $35 billion in 20102011, but Mexico accounted for
less than $100 million.
To inaugurate a new stage in the
bilateral relationship, the public,
private and academic sectors
must work together to establish
priorities. It is not clear that Latin
American and Mexican elites have
a sense of urgency regarding trade
with China; they may require
another decade or so to understand
and analyze the issue. Urgent
high-level political support will
be required to overcome existing
institutional, economic and
political limitations and avoid an
escalation of tensions that could
result in an impasse. ■
Enrique Dussel Peters is a
professor at the Graduate School
of Economics and the coordinator
of the Center for Chinese-Mexican
Studies at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). He
is the author of several articles and
books, including the edited volume
“40 años de la relación entre México
y China. Acuerdos, desencuentros y
futuro” (2012).

prestigious Title VI National Resource Center of the Latin
American and Caribbean Center (LACC) and Asian Studies.
AGLA focuses on establishing and examining points of
intersection between the regions of Asia and Latin America by
analyzing issues such as diaspora/migration patterns; religion
and cultural/national identity; trade/political economy; systems
of education and reform; environmental/labor issues; and
Internet commerce/technology.
For more information, visit http://casgroup.fiu.edu/asian
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Cuba and China:
In Mixed Enterprise We Trust
By Adrian H. Hearn

China’s Vice-President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Cuban President Raúl Castro on June 5, 2011 at Revolution Palace in Havana. Xi was in Cuba
on a four-day official visit. China, Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela and a key source of credit, has investments in transportation, oil,
appliances, communications and tourism in the communist-ruled island. ALEJANDRO ERNESTO/AFP/Getty Images.

A

s the Cuban
government eases
restrictions on
small trade and
commerce, nobody
is exploring new opportunities
more actively than the island’s
Chinese community. Like the
20
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Chinese diaspora across Latin
America, its members are seeking a
head start by pursuing new sources
of investment and trade with
globally minded entrepreneurs in
Mainland China. The community
is small; its coordinating body, the
Casino Chung Wah, registered 171

surviving first-generation Chinese
in Cuba in 2011. Altogether,
however, Havana’s 13 Chinese
ethnic associations boast some
3,000 second- and third-generation
members of mixed ancestry who
are well integrated into Cuban
economic and political life and eager
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to build commercial bridges across
the Pacific.
In January 2012, the 125th
anniversary of Havana’s Min Chih
Tang Association brought aspiring
Chinese-Cuban entrepreneurs
together with potential business
partners from China who are
exploring the frontiers of the island’s
evolving economic landscape and
hoping to introduce supermarkets,
electronics outlets and tourism
services as they have across the
Caribbean and Southeast Asia.
Tight restrictions have inhibited
their expansion into Cuba, but they
are confident this will change under
Raúl Castro’s reform agenda. If they
are correct, then the connections
and trust they are forging with
Cuba’s Chinese community will
serve them well.
As much as they would like to
broker trade with their motherland,
Cuba’s Chinese associations must
be careful not to overstep their
bounds. Regulated by the Ministry
of Justice since 1978, they are
required to focus on cultural
activities. The government tends to
view the success of the associations’
restaurants (each of which earns
between $3,000-$5,000 per day,
the author found in 2011 and
2012), with a blend of admiration
and suspicion. The main thing,
says the Ministry’s Director of
Associations, Miriam García, is that
Cuban grassroots institutions respect
the country’s Law of Association,
which since 1888 has ensured
state oversight of their finances.
“Without this guidance,” she
believes, “the Chinese associations
would become overwhelmed by
commercial aspirations. We trust

them to openly comply, and in
return they trust us to look after
their bank accounts.”
Trust between state and society
has long been a topic of debate in
Cuba, particularly with regard to
the “social contract” that since 1959
has guaranteed citizens access to
basic goods and services. Just as
Deng Xiaoping abandoned China’s
“iron rice bowl” in the 1980s, the
situation in Cuba is changing.
Guaranteed rights to employment
and housing are “melting into air”
as the state gradually relieves itself of
half a million employees and permits
citizens to buy and sell houses and
cars. The 313 Social and Economic
Policy Guidelines published in 2011
show growing acceptance of market
forces as a “complement” to Cuba’s
state-dominated system of trade and
investment. The aim is to develop
an economy that is less dependent
on the state but nevertheless serves
national interests, and a citizenry
that trusts the political stewardship
of its government.
In attempting to introduce a
more mixed economy, Raúl Castro
appears to have taken a page from
Deng’s book. Among the insights
derived from China — with varying
degrees of attentiveness — are
the gradual implementation of
reforms under a state-appointed
Permanent Commission for
Implementation and Development;
military management of commercial
activities; coordinated upgrades
of industrial sectors; trial runs
of reforms prior to wider
implementation; and a more
conciliatory approach to emigrants
as a source of much-needed
investment. In November 2010,

Cuban National Assembly President
Ricardo Alarcón visited Beijing and
officially recognized the relevance
of China’s economic evolution for
Cuba’s development. Raúl Castro
had already expressed this sentiment
during his visits in 1997 and 2005,
which focused on labor market
reform and the creation of hybrid
public-private enterprise.
Chinese officials have been
advocating economic liberalization
to their Cuban counterparts ever
since Fidel Castro visited Beijing
in 1995. Cuba has good reason to
listen: China is now the country’s
second largest trading partner after
Venezuela, with annual bilateral
trade of $1.83 billion in 2010
(down from a high of $2.27 billion
in 2008, before the global financial
crisis, and up from just $314
million in 2000). The increase in
trade has been accompanied by
closer political ties. In June 2011,
Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping
and China National Petroleum
Corporation President Jiang
Jiemin visited Havana to establish
the first Five-Year Plan for SinoCuban Cooperation. Among the
initiatives under negotiation are
Chinese investments in Cuban oil
and gas; expansion of academic
exchange programs (which currently
accommodate some 100 Cuban
and 2,000 Chinese students); and
assembly of low-cost televisions,
air conditioners and kitchen
appliances. Other proposals include
direct China Air flights between
Havana and Beijing, and credits and
loans for Cuba’s emerging market
economy.
China’s Political Attaché in
Havana, Yu Bo, believes that
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Members of the Chinese community in Cuba wave farewell to China’s President Hu Jintao during his departure from the José Martí International
Airport in Havana on November 19, 2008. China’s President Hu wrapped up a landmark visit to Cuba, where he brought millions of dollars in aid and
promises of closer trade ties. JUAN CARLOS BORJAS/AFP/Getty Images.

Sino-Cuban cooperation will
require a careful balance of
market entrepreneurship and state
supervision if it is to fulfill its
potential. “Market-led systems
demand business acumen, and stateled systems demand intelligence; we
need both,” he has said. Industrial
upgrading, tourism development,
and financial services require
creativity and initiative, but they
also call for long-term planning and
regulatory oversight. With China’s
support, Cuba now appears to be
on track toward a more effective
balance of the two.
In the wake of the Soviet collapse,
22
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Francis Fukuyama famously argued
that the key to prosperity lies in
spontaneous trust among citizens
and entrepreneurship uninhibited by
state intervention. Since the global
financial crisis, world leaders from
Hu Jintao to Barack Obama have
questioned the wisdom of the small
government thesis, but Cuba’s
reformers may yet find a pearl of
wisdom in Fukuyama’s thinking.
If their efforts to blend private
enterprise with public oversight
are to succeed, regulations must be
developed to encourage rather than
impede local initiative and trust.
Havana’s Chinese associations

demonstrate what is at stake. Their
efforts to foment cooperation and
trust with business partners across
the Pacific could open valuable
commercial channels for the
island. The key question on their
members’ minds is whether or not
the Cuban government will trust
them to do so. ■
Adrian H. Hearn is an Australian
Research Council Future Fellow
specializing in international relations
at the University of Sydney China
Studies Centre. He is editor of “China
Engages Latin America: Tracing the
Trajectory” (2011, Lynne Rienner).
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Taiwan: More than
Checkbook Diplomacy
By Cristina Eguizábal

U

ntil 1971, the
government of the
Republic of China
(ROC) occupied
China’s seat on
the UN Security Council. When
Chiang Kai-shek retreated in 1949
from Nanjing after Mao Zedong
and his Communist troops defeated
the Kuomintang, only members
of the Soviet camp recognized
the newly proclaimed People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Sweden,
Denmark and Switzerland followed
suit one year later, but for the next
20 years the rest of the Western
world would recognize the ROC,
based in Taiwan, as the legitimate
government of China. France was
the first major Western country
to recognize Beijing, exchanging
ambassadors in 1965. Others soon
followed its example and in 1971,
following Washington’s recognition
of the PRC, Beijing went on to
occupy China’s UN seat.
Today only 23 countries, 12
of them in Latin American and
the Caribbean, still recognize the
ROC. These are, in alphabetical
order: Belize, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Saint Christopher and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines.
However, Taiwan’s status in the
world’s economy – nineteenth
according to GDP, seventeenth
major exporter and sixteenth major
importer – creates ambiguous

Members of the Taiwanese community take part in the commemorative parade for Taiwan’s 100 th
anniversary in Guatemala City on August 7, 2011. JOHAN ORDONEZ/AFP/Getty Images.

situations for most countries in the
Western Hemisphere, including the
United States. Taiwan’s democratic
consolidation, clearly demonstrated
during the last presidential election,
further complicates the matter of
diplomatic recognition.
Beijing insists that countries
cannot have official relations with
both China and Taiwan. To deal
with this challenge, Taiwan has
established a pragmatic alternative
system of “external relations”
that allows it to conduct formal
business with most countries of the
world. In 1979, for example, the
US Congress passed the Taiwan
Relations Act authorizing official
relations with the “governing
authorities on Taiwan” and
honoring the validity of all previous
obligations contracted with the
ROC. US law treats Taiwan the

same way it does any “foreign
countries, nations, states,
governments, or similar entities.”
Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and
Peru all have thriving commercial
relations with the island managed
by trade offices in lieu of fullfledged embassies. The Brazilian
government recently announced
that Foxconn, the Taiwanese
multinational electronics
manufacturer, plans to build five
new Apple iPad assembly plants
in its territory. Final negotiations
with the company were held on
the mainland, where Foxconn
has most of its factories, during
President Dilma Rousseff ’s official
visit to China.
After years of tense relations,
Beijing and Taipei have found
a productive modus vivendi.
Hemisphere Volume 21
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Mainland China is Taiwan’s most
Honduras in 2007, and is
changing and the PRC has begun
important trading partner and
negotiating an accord with the
competing with Taipei in dollar
Taiwan is China’s most important
Dominican Republic. To facilitate
terms –and often outbidding it.
foreign investor. With seven
Taiwanese private investment
Dominica switched recognition
million visits annually across the
overseas, Taipei has established a
in 2004 after Beijing offered it
Taiwan Strait, the two societies
$250 million fund to encourage
US$112 million over six years,
have become economically
Taiwanese companies, a Central
dwarfing Taipei’s US$9 million
integrated. Despite all the
and South American research
assistance. In 2005, the PRC won
advances, however, the relationship
center, and several investment
Grenada’s diplomatic recognition by
is still a work in progress.
consulting missions. The island
offering to build 2,000 low-income
During the Cold War, Taiwan
holds observer status at the System
houses and new hospital facilities,
played an important role in training
for Integration of Central America
support the agricultural sector,
Central American soldiers after
(SICA) and the Central American
transfer US$1 million in cash for
the Carter administration
Grenadian government
asked Congress to cut off
scholarships, replace
military assistance to the
Taiwan’s US$6 million
repressive governments of
donation to complete
Guatemala, El Salvador
community projects, and
and Somoza’s Nicaragua.
provide budget support
Taiwan no longer provides
until 2009. In addition,
such military assistance
Beijing promised financial
but it still participates in
assistance to rebuild
military student exchanges.
Grenada’s National
Development aid is
Stadium for the 2007
aligned with Millennium
Cricket World Cup.
Development Objectives
Anti-China activists carry a banner as they march through the Taipei streets Before recognizing Beijing,
and disbursed through the on September 4, 2011. About 1,000 activists chanting pro-independence
Costa Rica insisted that
International Cooperation slogans took to the streets, accusing Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou
it buy US$300 million
of surrendering the island’s sovereignty to former bitter rival China.
and Development Fund.
in state bonds, provide
PATRICK LIN/AFP/Getty Images.
Taiwanese cooperation
US$130 million in aid
focuses on strengthening the
Parliament (PARLACEN) and
plus scholarships for study in China
private sector, particularly
is an extra-regional member of
and, most conspicuously, contribute
small and medium enterprises,
the Central American Bank for
US$74 million to build the capital’s
through technical assistance in
Economic Integration (BCIE) and
new soccer stadium.
communications and information
Inter-American Development Bank
Nobody doubts that time is on
technology, development of human
(IADB).
Beijing’s side. In the meantime,
capital and access to credit. It
The role of Taiwanese nonhowever, self-determination remains
also supplies medical assistance
governmental organizations is
crucial for Taiwan, and anything
after humanitarian disasters. Less
also rapidly expanding. The Tzu
that can foster the legitimacy of
transparent and more questionable
Chi Buddhist Foundation, a
its claims to sovereignty is key.
are cash donations for housing
humanitarian organization, operates
The small Central American and
projects and fancy government
offices in Asunción, San Salvador,
Caribbean countries are important
buildings.
Santo Domingo, Guatemala City,
pieces on the chessboard. ■
Taiwanese diplomacy is not
Tijuana, Mexicali, São Paulo and
confined to the checkbook. The
Buenos Aires.
Cristina Eguizábal is a professor
island is also aggressively pursuing
Until recently, Beijing had
of international relations and the
free trade agreements. It finalized
not expressed much interest in
director of the Latin American
negotiations with Panama in 2003,
competing with Taipei for the small
and Caribbean Center at Florida
Guatemala in 2005, Nicaragua
Central American and Caribbean
International University.
in 2006, and El Salvador and
markets. This has been slowly
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Japan and Latin America:
New Patterns in
Bilateral Relations
By Vladimir Rouvinski

R

elations between
Japan and Latin
America in
general receive
little attention
from domestic or international
observers. Japanese overtures
have been cautious due to the
importance attached to Japan’s
strategic alliance with the United
States. On both sides of the
Pacific Ocean, however, key
actors agree that the world is
living through times of dramatic
change that will eventually define
the future world order. Both
Japan and Latin America share
some common concerns – as well
as expectations – regarding the
impact these changes may have on
their interests in the international
arena in terms of political and
economic power. For the powerful
East Asian nation, the whole of
Latin America is “a continent in
transition,” as the title of a recent
issue of the journal of the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) proclaims. A great deal
of the differentiation Tokyo has
shown in its bilateral relations
has to do with its understanding
of the nature of this transition.
New Pillars of Cooperation
Several factors help illuminate
the complex dynamics of Japanese
involvement in Latin America.
First, and most important, Japan

A rescuer from the Mexican Red Cross searches for bodies with a dog in Sendai on March 16,
2011, days after a massive earthquake and tsunami devastated the coast of eastern Japan. FRED
DUFOUR/AFP/Getty Images.

is facing an identity crisis over
its future. Only recently, many
considered the country to be the
leading rival to United States
power, and the government’s
capacity to assure a bright future
for its citizens was seldom
questioned. The March 2011
earthquake and tsunami, however,
caused damage not only to the
country’s infrastructure and
environment but also to the
confidence of the Japanese people
in their government. Debate has
intensified about domestic as well

as foreign policy. While it is true
that Latin America has not been
at the center of these debates,
the outcome will have an impact
on Japanese foreign policy in the
Western Hemisphere. After all,
the key issues at the top of foreign
policy debates in Japan –namely,
the demise of US hegemonic power
and the rise of China – are familiar
topics in Latin America.
There is no doubt that Japan
is closely watching the changing
patterns of relationships in
the Western Hemisphere and,
Hemisphere Volume 21
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especially, the rise of emerging
actors from Asia, such as China
and India. These developments
are moving Japan away from
its traditional appreciation of
multilateral cooperation agreements
and toward the promotion of
regionalism. Since signing the
Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) with Mexico in
2004, Tokyo has forged similar
agreements with Chile, Colombia
and Peru. Nevertheless, the
itineraries of high-level Japanese
officials continue to exclude
most Latin American countries.
In 2000-2010, Japanese prime
ministers visited only those
countries with an established
history of relations with Japan,
namely, Brazil, Peru and Mexico.
The majority of Latin American
presidents, in contrast, paid
personal visits to Tokyo.
Trade, Investment and
International Cooperation
Latin American presidents’
willingness to travel long distances
is easy to explain: Japan is one
of the most promising foreign
investors in the region and its
foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Latin America and the Caribbean is
second only to its FDI in Asia. The
first Japanese investments in Latin
America date back to the 1950s and
1960s, but only since the beginning
of the twenty-first century have
changes in the investment policies
of the large Japanese general trading
companies paved the way for the
appreciation of new opportunities
in Latin America.
Currently, the mining sector is
the driving force for major Japanese
investments in the region, in
addition to the automobile and
electronics industries in the case
of Brazil and Mexico. These new
26
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Japanese investments are possible
because Tokyo has started to
consider the region’s long-term
stability, and the promotion of
democratic regimes and market
economies, as key elements of its
foreign policy in Latin America.
To this end, Japan has adopted
the “two Ds” – Democracy
and Development – and is
actively fomenting international
cooperation, after having been a
leading donor for decades.
By 2010, Japanese exports to
Latin America and the Caribbean
had reached US$31.4 billion, an
increase of 34.8% in just five years
and the highest growth of Japanese
exports anywhere in the world.
Japan’s imports from the region
also grew, to US$18.6 billion, an
increase of 26.3% over 2005.
“Things happen for a reason” is
a favorite Japanese saying. One
of the reasons for the success of
Japanese trade and investment in
Latin America is the existence of an
environment of trust and mutual
respect in bilateral relations. This
climate is the result of a long
history of peaceful and mutually
beneficial relations dating back as
long as 400 years, in the case of
Mexico. New developments have
also played a role. Emergency aid
from Latin America was mostly
symbolic following the 2011
tsunami, but it highlighted an
important feature of current Latin
American relations with Japan: the
existence of a human bond between
these two geographically distant
parts of the world.
A People’s Connection
Shortly after the quake and
tsunami hit eastern Japan, the
Japanese consulate in Rio de
Janeiro opened its phone lines for
inquires. In a few short hours,
the Brazilian Ministry for External
Relations received about 4000

e-mails and phone calls from
people with relatives in Japan.
Brazilians are the largest expatriate
community in Japan, second only
to Chinese and Korean immigrants.
The 1.5 million nipo-brasileiros
represent a strong link between the
two countries.
Until only recently, discussions
about the significance of emigrant
groups in Japan would likely
have focused on the amount
of cash they sent back to the
Americas. In some cases,
remittances reach several billion
dollars and could be compared to
the amount of Japanese exports
to the region. The response to
the 2011 earthquake, however,
revealed some new features in
the relationship. Organized
Latin American communities in
Japan are becoming increasingly
visible and are attempting to
promote a positive image. In
the aftermath of the Fukushima
disaster, Brazilian groups from
across Japan formed a volunteer
organization called Brasil Solidário
to provide assistance to the
devastated areas. A few months
later, Kawamata township, which
lies partially within the nuclear
no-entry zone, hosted Cosquín en
Japón, named after the famous
festival in Argentina and said to
be the largest Latin American
event in Japan. Cultural and
community events and activities
are proliferating across the country
and helping to build a positive
image of Latin America among
the Japanese, contributing to
the development of stronger ties
between the two regions. ■
Vladimir Rouvinski is director of
the CIES Research Center at Icesi
University in Cali, Colombia. He
studies Asian countries and Russia’s
relations with Latin America.

L ACC SUMMER PRO GR AMS

HAITIAN SUMMER INSTITUTE 2012
Now entering its 15th year, LACC’s Haitian Summer Institute
is a six-week program designed for anyone interested in
acquiring basic conversational proficiency in Haitian Creole
and also for students who wish to continue their Haitian
Creole language training at intermediate and advanced levels.
Participants are introduced to Haitian history and culture
through lectures presented by renowned Haitianists and
Diasporic leaders, film, technical training sessions and tours
of Miami’s Little Haiti neighborhood. The institute is held in
Miami, home to a vibrant Haitian community.
DATES
July 2-August 10, 2012
COURSES
Accelerated Beginning Haitian Creole
Accelerated Intermediate Haitian Creole
Advanced Haitian Creole/Haiti: Language & Culture
PROGRAM INFORMATION
Latin American and Caribbean Center
MMC-DM 353
Miami, FL
305-348-2894
http://lacc.fiu.edu

Politics and international relations in
argentina 2012
LACC’s Politics & International Relations in Argentina study
abroad program is an intensive 4-week program designed to foster
an understanding of Latin American international relations and
society through the experience of living and studying in one of
the most vibrant cosmopolitan cities in the Americas. Open to
both undergraduate and graduate students, the program takes an
interdisciplinary approach to the study of the region.
DATES
June 25-July 20, 2012
Courses
International Relations of Latin America
Argentine Politics, Society, History and Culture
PROGRAM INFORMATION
Latin American and Caribbean Center
MMC-DM 353
Miami, FL
305-348-2894
http://lacc.fiu.edu

New from Cambridge University Press
Julia C. Strauss is Senior

Lecturer in Chinese Politics
in the Department of Politics
and International Studies
and a member of the Centre
of Chinese Studies at the
University of London.
Ariel C. Armony is Weeks

Professor in Latin American
Studies, Professor of
International Studies and
Director of the Center for
Latin American Studies
(CLAS) at the University of
Miami.

From the Great Wall to the New World:
China and Latin America in the 21st Century
Edited by Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony
Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming May 2012
From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st
Century goes beyond policy analysis and examines a wide range of “new”
interactions between China and Latin America. Authors discuss transnational
flows of capital and people, fluidity of perceptions between China and Latin
America, stereotypes and “othering” of Latin America within China, and
changing rhetorical assumptions of the top leadership for the China-Latin
America relationship. With its base of primary source material from Mexico,
Peru, Colombia, Brazil and China, From the Great Wall to the New World:
China and Latin America in the 21st Century makes an important contribution
to the small but emerging body of academic scholarship on China and
Latin America and provides the reader with unique insight into an evolving
relationship worth watching.
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In Search of Balance,
Brazil Looks to Asia
By Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida

B

razil has had established
relations with Asia
since the beginning
of the twentieth
century, when waves of
Japanese immigrants founded the
largest Japanese community outside
Japan. These immigrants played an
important role in creating a modern
and productive agricultural sector,
especially – but not only – in the
green belt surrounding metropolitan
São Paulo. The Japanese fully
integrated into Brazilian society,
experiencing a successful upward
mobility. Their descendants –
known as Niseis, Sanseis or Yonseis
– are today an integral part of the
nation and its multiethnic elite.
The late 1950s and 60s brought
Japanese investment as part of
Brazil’s efforts to become an
industrialized country. Korean
firms followed in the late 1970s
and 80s, contributing to the
development of the electronics
industry. In both cases, Brazil’s
import substitution policies, aimed
at boosting national production of
industrial goods for the growing
domestic market, were crucial in
attracting Japanese and Korean
firms. Today, two Japanese and
one Korean firm are among Brazil’s
50 largest enterprises. Japan and
Korea are also among the country’s
10 most important trading partners
(see Table 1).
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An elderly woman, known as a ‘Nisei’ in Brazil – a second generation Brazilian-Japanese – walks past
a graffiti-marked wall in Liberdade, a central São Paulo neighborhood that has the feel of a Little Tokyo
because of its high concentration of Japanese descendants. Marc Burleigh/AFP/Getty Images.

If Japanese and Korean
investments are a chapter in
the history of Brazil’s state-led
and internal market-centered
industrialization, Chinese
participation is much more recent
and stems from dramatic changes
in the South American country’s
economic policies. Since 1990,
cautious market-oriented reforms
and moderate and selective
liberalization of international trade,
aimed at deepening integration into
the global economy, have replaced
import substitution as the main
strategy for economic growth.
Brazil’s international trade grew
steadily and the country became
a fully global player. In 2011,
China surpassed the United States

as the most important market for
Brazilian imports, as Table 1 shows.
Brazil provides commodities to
China and buys its manufactured
products.
The increasing importance of
China for Brazil’s international
trade and the nature of the
exchange have resulted in some
domestic tension. Brazilian
industrialists fear competition
from Chinese industrial goods and
have asked for market protection.
Analysts and scholars of nationalist
persuasion have warned that what
they call unfair competition from
Chinese goods risks ruining Brazil’s
industrial sector.
Although trade is central to
Brazil’s relations with China, more

Reports

Chinese Vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff talk during a meeting at Planalto Palace in Brasilia, on February 13,
2012. Wang was in Brazil to participate in the Second Plenary Session of the Chinese-Brazilian High-Level Concertation and Cooperation Commission
(COSBAN). EVARISTO SA/AFP/Getty Images.

than trade is involved. Since at
least 2002, Brazil’s foreign policy
has emphasized South-South
relations to make the country
not only a global trader but also
a global player. South-South

cooperation is meant to softbalance the great powers, especially
the United States, and widen spaces
for emerging middle powers such
as Brazil. Accordingly, Brazil voted
in favor of China’s application to

BRAZIL FOREIGN TRADE MOST IMPORTANT PARTNERS 2011
IMPORTS

EXPORTS

1. USA (15.1% )

1. CHINA (16.9% )

2. CHINA (14% )

2. USA (9.9%)

3. ARGENTINA (7.6%)

3. ARGENTINA (8.8%)

4. GERMANY (6.7%)

4. NETHERLANDS( 5.6%)

5. SOUTH KOREA (4.7%)

5. GERMANY (3.8%)

6. NIGERIA (4.4%)

6. JAP AN (3.5%)

7. JAPAN (3.8%)

7. RUSSIA (2.5%)

8. ITALY (2.7%)

8. CHILE (2.3%)

9. INDIA (2.4%)
9. FRANCE (2.4%)
10. CHILE (2.2%)
10. MEXICO (2.2%)

Table 1. Source: MIDC, Brazil, 2012.

9. ITALY (2.3%)
10. SPAIN (2.1%)
11. UNITED KINGDOM (1.9%)

join the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which entailed recognition
of China as a market economy,
and the two countries established
the High Level Chinese-Brazilian
Commission for Coordination and
Cooperation in 2004. The new
Chinese Ambassador to Brazil is
said to be the third man in the
Chinese Foreign Affairs hierarchy,
a demonstration of the importance
that China assigns its relations
with Brazil. In turn, Brazil
expects Chinese recognition and
support for its aspiration to play
a greater role in the international
arena, and especially its demand
for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council.
Brazil has tried to further
strengthen ties with Asia and,
in particular, with India and
Hemisphere Volume 21
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at the WTO. Brazilian researchers
Amancio de Oliveira and Janina
Onuki have shown, however, that
while defensive coalitions against
the developed countries worked
well, important differences regarding
Indian and Brazilian agriculture
interests still hinder concerted proactive behavior at the WTO.
Data from surveys of Brazilian
elites as part of the international
collaborative project “Las Américas
y el Mundo” reveal the importance
these groups ascribe to Asian
countries and their support for
a South-South strategy. Table 2
lists the countries that respondents
considered vital to Brazilian interests
around the world. Three of six
countries with the highest scores
are Asian. Fifty-six percent of those
interviewed think that trade with
South America and large developing
countries such as China, India and
South Africa should have priority,

Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna and
Brazilian Minister of External Relations Antonio
de Aguiar Patriota shake hands prior to a meeting
in New Delhi on December 12, 2011 during an
official visit by a Brazilian delegation to India.
PRAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images.

South Africa, through the IndiaBrazil-South Africa Dialogue
Forum, and it advanced coalitionbuilding efforts during agriculture
negotiations in the Doha Round

against 19% who say that priority
should be given to trade with the
developed North (United States,
Europe and Japan).
In brief, Brazil today looks to
Asia in search of markets for its
goods as well as partners in its push
for a more balanced multipolar
international system with greater
room for emerging countries. This
strategy is not merely a government
policy but a more permanent state
policy, widely supported by Brazilian
elites. Tensions will emerge and
differences will appear, but the result
will be an open process that depends
as much on changes in the structure
of the international system as on the
policy choices of emerging countries
in Asia and South America. ■
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida is
Professor of Political Science and Dean
of the Institute of International Relations
at University of São Paulo, Brazil.

BRAZIL’S GEOPOLITICAL PRIORITIES

(Responses to the question, “In which of the following
countries does Brazil have vital interest?”
United States
China
Argentina
India
Japan
Germany
Cuba
Israel
Iran
Indonesia
Costa Rica
Honduras

7

93

8

91

10

90

19

79

23

77

25

75

53

46

59

40

63

37

Has vital interest

64

35

75

23

Does not have
vital interest

74

23

Table 2. Source: Las Américas y El Mundo Database.
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The New India and the
New Latin America
By Jorge Heine

C

hile is widely
considered to be
one of the most
internationally
oriented and
cosmopolitan countries in Latin
America. With a 95% literacy
rate, one of the world’s most open
economies and an export-driven
economic development model, it
is often mentioned as one of the
developing countries that have
made the most of globalization. To
do so, it has relied on its unique
“lateral” international trade policy.
By signing free trade agreements
(FTAs) with as many countries
as possible (59 as of this writing),
Chile has gained preferential access
to the world’s leading markets.
Chile’s exports grew eight-fold from
1990 to 2010, from US$9 billion to
some US$70 billion. Many of these
efforts at opening up new markets
have been directed at Asia. Yet,
amazing as it may sound, until 2005
– 58 years into Indian independence
– no Chilean president had ever
visited India. Forty-six years
went by between the first visit
by a Chilean foreign minister to
India (in 1957) and the second (in
2003). Mutual indifference cannot
explain this long gap: Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi paid a state
visit to Chile in 1968, and President
Shankar Dayal Sharma visited the
country in 1995.
The Chilean example may be
extreme, but it is by no means
an isolated case. For the first 50
years of Indian independence, the

subcontinent hardly seemed to
exist for Latin America, and viceversa. India and Latin America were
not only far apart geographically
and culturally; they also belonged
to different “clubs.” Once a part
of the British Empire, India is a
member of the Commonwealth
and the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM). As former Spanish or
Portuguese colonies, Latin American
countries deployed their multilateral
efforts within entities such as the
Organization of American States
(OAS) and, more recently, the
Ibero-American summits. With the
exception of Cuba, Latin American
countries largely stayed away from
the NAM. Even Asian-American
organizations that crossed the Pacific
divide, such as the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum, did not include India.
Fast-forward to 2012. Over the
course of the past decade, IndoLatin American relations (IndoLAC, for short) have flourished.
The number of Latin American and
Caribbean embassies in New Delhi
has increased from 12 in 2002 to 18
in 2012, and the number of Indian
embassies based in the LAC region
has doubled, from seven to 14 in
the same period. Only 10 Latin
American presidents visited India
from 1947 to 2000, but 12 did so
from 2000 to 2011. Brazil’s Lula
visited India three times during his
eight years in office, on one occasion
as India’s chief guest on Republic
Day, one of the highest honors the
Indian government bestows on

visiting heads of state. Similarly,
after a long period of apparent
diplomatic indifference, three state
visits took place between Chilean
and Indian presidents in just four
years: Ricardo Lagos to India
(January 2005); Pratibha Patil to
Chile (April 2008); and Michelle
Bachelet to India (March 2009).
Far from being pro forma exercises
in diplomatic protocol, these were
all substantial meetings. The
Chilean presidents stayed in India
for five days, stretching the limit
for state visits, and President Patil,
India’s first female head of state,
included the stop in Chile as part of
her first trip abroad.
What happened? The easy answer
is what the Indian press refers to as
“the Global Indian Takeover,” by
which it means the emergence of
the New India in the new century.
This is only partly correct. Far from
being a mere reflection of the socalled “Indian miracle,” the upsurge
in Indo-LAC ties reflects not just
the emergence of a New India, but
also that of a New Latin America.
Leaving behind the inward-oriented,
protectionist strategies of the past,
India and many Latin American
countries have opened up their
economies, embraced export-led
development and, in the process,
discovered the enormous mutual
opportunities this entails.
A Burgeoning Trade
One example is the increase in
trade between India and Latin
America, which totaled around
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Naveen Jindal, Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., attends a session at the World Economic Forum’s India Economic
Summit in New Delhi, India, on Nov. 15, 2010. Jindal is investing in iron ore in Bolivia. Prashanth Vishwanathan/Bloomberg via
Getty Images.

US$23 billion in 2011 (up from a
meager US$500 million in 1990).
India has also invested some US$12
billion in the region since 2000.
As Graph 1 indicates, this trade
is quite concentrated, with Chile,
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay
providing the bulk of exports to
India, and Brazil, Peru, Colombia
and Nicaragua accounting for a
significant amount of imports.
Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs) with Chile and Mercosur
have helped. Chilean exports to
India grew tenfold from 2003 to
2007, reaching US$2.2 billion.
Indo-LAC trade is projected to
grow by 20% (approximately US$5
billion) in 2012, with Indo-Brazilian
trade alone expected to reach US$11
billion, up from US$9.2 billion
in 2011. As one Indian diplomat
put it, “Indian companies will
target Latin America even more
vigorously in 2012 to make up for
the slow growth of exports to the
developed markets.” India is not
the only country with this strategy;
Latin America’s trade with the rest
of the world crossed the trilliondollar mark in 2011 and foreign
direct investment (FDI) jumped to
a record US$139 billion, up from
32
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US$75 billion in 2010.
Indian companies investing
in Latin America include Tata
Consulting Services (IT),
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories
(pharmaceuticals), United
Phosphorus (agrochemicals), Shree
Sugars, Havelis Silvania (lighting
equipment), Videcon (television),
ONGC Videsh (oil), and the Godrej
group (cosmetics). Jindal Steel and
Power has initiated a US$2.3 billion
investment in Bolivia’s El Mutún
iron ore mine, the South American
country’s biggest FDI project ever.
In Trinidad and Tobago, Essar Steel
is establishing a 2.5 million-ton steel
plant. In 2002, Tata Consulting
set up a Global Delivery Center in
Montevideo that put Uruguay on
the global IT map. Some 35,000
Latin Americans work for Indian
companies in the region, half of
them for IT and IT-enabled service
companies. Though still on a small
scale, there is little doubt that these
investments have been an important
addition to local economies,
contributing valuable jobs skills and
technology transfer.
India and China in Latin America
Compared to Sino-LAC trade,

valued at some US$140 billion in
2010, India’s figures are relatively
small. Some observers are skeptical
of the possibility of a surge in IndoLAC trade and investment, but we
must keep in mind that in 2000,
Sino-LAC trade was around US$12
billion. The noted Indian economist
Manmohan Agarwal has pointed
out that on a number of indicators
(exports, openness of the economy,
and outward-bound FDI), India lags
some 10 to 12 years behind China,
which is roughly the gap between
the initiation of policy reforms
and the respective opening of the
Chinese and Indian economies. If
this is the case, by 2020 Indian
trade with Latin American could
very well cross the hundred billion
dollar mark. This is buttressed by
projections indicating that India’s
growth rate could be higher than
China’s by then.
Latin America, and in particular
South America, is becoming
a significant source of natural
resources, such as oil, copper, soy
and iron ore, for India as well
as for China. Some observers
warn that Asian demand for these
commodities could lead to the
region’s de-industrialization. This
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Graph 1. Latin America and the Caribbean: Relative Importance of India as a Trade Partner, Annual Average, 2008-2010
(Percentages of each country’s total exports and imports) a,b
A. Imports						

Source: ECLAC (2011) India and
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Opportunities and Challenges in Trade
and Investment Relations (Santiago:
United Nations/ECLAC) LC/L3426,
November, p. 39.
a Data are not available for Antigua &
Barbuda and Honduras from 2008;
Saint Kitts & Nevis and Saint Lucia
from 2009; or for Bahamas, Granada,
Honduras, Saint Kitts & Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago and
Uruguay from 2010.
b Oil statistics were estimated by
COMTRADE and may not be
included for every country.

B. Exports

need not be the case. Demand
for food will continue to expand
exponentially in India, a country
with significant water scarcity. Latin
America has around 30% of the
world’s fresh water reserves, making
it an agricultural powerhouse. Its
producers may very well want to
move up the value chain in this
area and start to export more
sophisticated farm products. Latin
American industries also need to
get into the Asian value chains that
have become such a critical part of

international trade.
The Indian and South American
economies are among the fastestgrowing and best performing in the
world today and they complement
each other in many ways. Despite
geographic and cultural distance,
these complementarities are coming
to the fore. There is still a long
way to go to expand and facilitate
trade and investment flows, but
the challenge of making SouthSouth cooperation work is again at
the top of the policy agenda – this

time driven by sound economic
opportunities rather than by
wishful thinking. ■
Jorge Heine holds the CIGI Chair in
Global Governance at the Balsillie
School of International Affairs,
Wilfrid Laurier University, in
Waterloo, Ontario. He served as
Chile’s ambassador to India from
2003 to 2007. His book (with
Andrew Cooper), “Which Way Latin
America? Hemispheric Politics Meets
Globalization,” is published by
United Nations University Press.
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South Korea and Latin America:
In the Dragon’s Shadow
By Gonzalo Paz

A

long with their
growing interest
in China, Latin
American countries
have expanded their
relations with South Korea in recent
years. The country has gained a new
prominence, with the 1988 Olympics,
Hyundai and Samsung gradually
overshadowing lingering memories of
the Korean War (to which Colombia
contributed troops). The rise of
China has diverted attention from this
more established relationship, which
has experienced quiet but steady
growth. Shared values with regard
to democracy and human rights
underpin this relationship, as does a
degree of economic complementarity.
Increased commercial exchanges
and investment, free trade areas,
broad technical cooperation and
development aid form a solid
foundation for continued growth,
despite the competition from China.
Korea enjoys a trillion-dollar
economy, per-capita income of more
than $20,000 and average 7% annual
growth. As an advanced industrial
country, it is an attractive partner
for Latin America. In the last two
decades, Latin America’s trade with
Korea grew 16% annually, less than
trade with China (27.5%) but more
than with the United States (7.4%),
the European Union (7.4%) or Japan
(7.7%). Bilateral trade between the
region and Korea equals roughly $45
billion dollars, 2.5% of total Latin
America trade (China now accounts
for around 13%).
The main Korean trade partners in
the region are Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
34
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Peru and Argentina. Latin American
exports are poorly diversified and
remain concentrated in a few mining
and agricultural products, which make
up roughly 75% of the region’s total
exports to Korea, just slightly more
diversified than its exports to China.

In the region, only Peru, Argentina,
Chile, Panama, Dominica and Bolivia
enjoyed a trade surplus with Korea in
2000-2009.
If the 1980s were, economically
speaking, a “lost decade” for Latin
America, the first decade of the new
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century was a period of economic
gain. Strong exports led to a virtuous
cycle of overall economic growth in
many countries, in turn attracting
more investment. In this context,
it was not surprising to see South
Korea become the first Asian country
to sign a free trade area (FTA) with
a South American country, Chile, in
February 2003. An FTA with Peru
followed in March 2011, and another
is being negotiated with Colombia.
Conversations for an FTA with
Mexico have been dragging for a
number of years due to the resistance
of the Mexican private sector, and
conversations with Mercosur have yet
to show clear progress, but bilateral
relations with Brazil are thriving.
South Korea also wants to sign an
FTA with the Central American
states, although the existing United
States FTA with the region could
pose an obstacle to these intentions.
South Korean authorities are eager
to promote private engagement in
the region as part of the country’s
general “global Korea” strategy.
Investment is on the rise, particularly
in Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Hyundai
will start producing cars in late
2012 in Brazil, where electronics
giant LG already has three factories.
Samsung runs a number of factories
and facilities in Mexico (in Tijuana,
Veracruz, Guadalajara, Mexico
City and Querétaro). The region
is also in the sights of President Lee
Myung Bak’s “resource diplomacy,”
aimed at securing sources of raw
material around the globe. Of
particular interest to the country’s
industry is lithium, some of the
most important deposits of which
are located in Bolivia, Argentina
and Chile. Lithium is a strategic
resource for manufacturing batteries
for everything from smartphones and
tablets to electric cars. The South
Korean steel giant POSCO has plans
to build lithium-ion batteries with
Bolivia’s Comibol and is working

with LI3Energy to exploit Chile’s
Maricunga fields. Other economic
areas with potential for growth are
financial cooperation and tourism.
South Korea’s political relations
with Latin America have historically
been positive. The region was a
crucial battlefield in the two Koreas’
struggle for diplomatic recognition
after the peninsula was divided in
1948, a struggle that ended in 1991
when both South and North Korea
joined the United Nations. UN
General Secretary Ban Ki-moon
is an old friend of the region, and
South Korea enjoys diplomatic
relations with most countries in Latin
America, with the notable exception
of Cuba. Several Latin American
presidents have visited Seoul and
the region frequently receives visits
from South Korean leaders. Current
President Lee Myung-Bak visited
Peru and Brazil in 2008, and Panama
and Mexico in 2010. In November
of that year, South Korea became
the first non-G-8 country to host
a G-20 summit, and it will hold
the Second Nuclear Summit in
March 2012. Leaders of several
Latin American countries were
scheduled to attend both events.
Each year, South Korean authorities
meet with their Mexican, Chilean
and Peruvian counterparts at Asian
Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) meetings.
South Korea is also well
represented in regional forums. It
has been a permanent observer at the
Organization of American States since
1981, and between 1999 and 2010 it
contributed around $120,000 to the
organization (just slightly less than
China, which contributed roughly
$130,000 in 2005-2010). It is also a
member of both the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Economic
Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The Korean presence in Latin
America is not new. Korean

immigrants make up one of the
largest Asian communities in
the region. Thriving Korean
populations in Brazil (50,000),
Argentina (20,000-25,000), Mexico
(8,000-12,000), Paraguay (5,0006000) and Chile (2,000) help put
a face to bilateral relations. Many
Koreans living in Latin America
have re-migrated, engaging in
samgak imin (triangular migration)
from South and North Korea to
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil; from
Argentina to Mexico and the United
States; and back again to Argentina.
While most South Koreans are still
deeply Confucian, many decades of
Christianity and modernization have
created a compatible framework for
understanding with Latin America.
South Korea has cultivated public
diplomacy for many years, first
because of the legacy of Japanese
colonialism and the struggle against
North Korea and, more recently, in
pursuit of soft power. The Korea
Foundation has mobilized peopleto-people exchanges, academic
cooperation and language courses. In
addition to Korean food, especially
kimchi, the cultural exports with the
strongest impact in Latin America are
taekwondo, an Olympic sport, and
Korean cinema. Hallyu, the Korean
pop culture (K-pop) movement
spreading in Asia, has also found a
market in the region.
South Korea and Latin America
have enjoyed a decade or more
of increasing trade, cooperation,
political understanding and cultural
exchange. The stage is set for further
expansion. China may dominate
Asian-Latin American relations, and
Japan may try a comeback, but some
fine niches and opportunities remain
up for grabs for Korea. ■
Gonzalo Paz is a lecturer in the
School of International Affairs at
George Washington University.
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Who?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is a dynamic partnership
between the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida International University (FIU)
and the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami (UM). Designated
as a U.S. Department of Education National Resource Center on Latin America, the Miami
Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is recognized as one of the nation’s top
institutions for the study of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Where?
From its incomparable location in Miami, the Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean
Studies creates unique and innovative opportunities for South Florida’s leading universities and
the communities they serve.

What?
Built on more than 25 years of UM and FIU faculty, student and community collaboration, the
Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies reaffirms South Florida as THE hub
for political, commercial, cultural, and scholarly exchange between the U.S. and its neighbors
to the South, and strategically positions Miami at the center of a broader global dialogue that
connects the rest of the world to Latin America and the Caribbean.

How?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies spearheads cutting-edge
research, expands and strengthens international linkages throughout the hemisphere, supports
cultural and academic exchange, promotes outreach, training, and networking for a broad
community of scholars, K-12 educators, journalists, governmental officials, and the business
sector, and develops and implements projects designed to strengthen societies and improve
the lives of people throughout the hemisphere.
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